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DISCOVERY OF CHATTELS IN OHIO
Levin v. Cleveland Welding Co.
187 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963)
Plaintiff sued defendants for personal injuries sustained in a fall
from his bicycle when the coaster brake locked, causing him to be thrown
to the ground. Plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of defendant manu-
facturers in placing a defective brake on the bicycle. On motion and
cross-petition for discovery 1 by the two defendants, plaintiff was ordered
by the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County to produce the bicycle
brake in his possession for examination and testing by defendants, even
though plaintiff established that if the brake were disassembled and any
part found to be broken it could not be re-assembled. Plaintiff appealed
from this order on the ground that the court lacked authority to order
plaintiff to produce a chattel for inspection and dismantling. The Court
of Appeals of Cuyahoga County affirmed the trial court's decision holding
that Revised Code section 2317.48 authorized the court to make such an
order and that the court had inherent authority to do so.
The Ohio statute 2 relied on in this case makes no specific listing
of what items are subject to discovery pursuant to it. Consequently,
the question arises as to whether or not the statute is broad enough to
provide for the discovery of chattels. Under this statute, discovery is
neither explicitly restricted to papers and records, as it is under Revised
Code section 2317.33,3 nor is the discovery of property expressly in-
I Although Revised Code § 2317A8, the controlling statute, seemingly requires
that a separate action be filed for discovery, neither the instant case nor Ohio courts
in general require it. They allow discovery on motion or cross-petition in the original
action. In the instant case one defendant filed a motion for the privilege of testing
and examining the brake and the other defendant by cross-petition prayed for dis-
covery and that the brake be made available for testing and examination. Levin
v. Cleveland Welding Co., 187 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317A8 (Page 1953) provides:
When a person claiming to have a cause of action or a defense to an
action commenced against him, without a discovery of the fact from the ad-
verse party, is unable to file his petition or answer, he may bring an action
for discovery, setting forth in his petition the necessity therefor and the
grounds thereof, with such interrogatories relating to the subject matter
of the discovery as are necessary to procure the discovery sought. If such
petition is not demurred to, it must be fully and directly answered under
oath by the defendant. Upon the final disposition of the action, the costs
thereof shall be taxed in such manner as the court deems equitable. (Em-
phasis added.)
3 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.33 (Page 1953) provides:
Either party, or his attorney, in writing, may demand of the adverse
party an inspection, and copy, or permission to take a copy of a book, paper,
or document in his possession or under his control, containing evidence re-
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cluded, as in federal rule 34.4 In the past, the statute has been used by
the Ohio courts principally for the discovery of papers and records and
to secure answers to interrogatories. In its opinion the court clearly states
that it was unable to find any Ohio authority requiring the production
of physical evidence for inspection and disassembly. 5 In jurisdictions
where there is express statutory authority to compel discovery and in-
spection of chattels, it has been unhesitatingly exercised in personal injury
cases, 6 but in Ohio it is questionable whether such statutory authority
exists.
In the absence of statutory authorization, courts differ as to whether
they have inherent power to order the production of chattels as a discovery
device. At common law in England, the adversary was treated as a game-
ster and was not compelled to produce chattels nor to allow the inspection
of premises in his control.7 The law courts of England never assumed
the existence of inherent power in the courts to compel the production of
lating to the merits of the action or defense, specifying the book, paper,
or document with sufficient particularity to enable the other party to dis-
tinguish it. If compliance with the demand within four days is refused,
on motion and notice to the adverse party, the court or judge may order the
adverse party to give the other, within the time specified, an inspection and
copy, or permission to take a copy of such book, paper or document. On
failure to comply with such order, the court may exclude the paper or
document if offered in evidence, or, if wanted as evidence by the party
applying, may direct the jury to presume it to be such as such party, by affi-
davit, alleges it to be. This section does not prevent a party from com-
pelling another to produce only book paper, or document when he is examined
as a witness.
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 provides:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice to
all other parties and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b) the court in
which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf
of the party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the
examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, cus-
tody, or control; or (2) order any party to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of in-
specting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated object or operation thereon within the scope of the examination
permitted by Rule 26(b). The order shall specify the time, place, and
manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis
added.)
5 Levin v. Cleveland Welding Co., supra note 1, at 189: "No Ohio case has
been cited to us, nor have we been able to find Ohio authority, to require the
production of physical evidence for inspection and disassembly"
6 Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 657 (1950); 17 Am. Jur. Discovery § 36 (1957).
7 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1862 (Supp. 1962); Comment, "Inspection Of Op-
ponent's Chattels Before Trial," 23 Ind. L.J. 333 (1948).
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chattels and did not begin to exercise such power until the advent of
statutes creating it; 8 however, in equity proceedings, the production of
chattels could be compelled on occasions where fairness seemed to demand
it.9
In this country, many of the early cases followed the common law and
refused to recognize any inherent power in the courts to order the dis-
covery and examination of property.10 The case best exemplifying this
older view is Welsh v. Gibbon," where the court recognized that a refusal
to order the production of chattels might result in an injustice, but refused
to issue such an order in the face of a statute which did not expressly
provide for it. The court held that it had no inherent power to issue such
an order and felt that to do so would be to invade the legislative preroga-
tive. Today, however, Welsh stands virtually alone.12
In Reynolds v. Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co.,13 an early case involving
pre-trial discovery, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that it was
the court's duty to facilitate the production of all evidence calculated to
furnish the jury with the basis for intelligent action and that if it had
probative value the court could order its production regardless of its
nature. And in Clark v. Tulare Lake Dredging Co.,14 in ordering the
production of certain machinery in the defendant's possession, the court
stated that every court has inherent power to go beyond its express
powers and to order the production of chattels where the interest of
justice demands it.
Nevertheless, in spite of the progress in this field over the last sixty
years, discovery was denied in the only prior reported case in which
discovery would have meant a destruction of property.15 In Ohio, prior
to the instant case, there bad been two reported cases in which the courts
had required the production of bottles and their contents for inspection
8 Comment, supra note 7.
9 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1862 (Supp. 1962); Kynaston v. East India Co., 3
Swanst. 248, 36 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1819).
10 Hunter v. Allen, 35 Barb. 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860); Cooke v. Lalance
Grojean Mfg. Co., 29 Hun 641, 3 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833);
Groundwater v. Washington, 92 Wis. 56, 65 N.W. 871 (1896). Contra, Auerbach
v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 66 App. Div. 201, 73 N.Y. Supp. 118 (1901); Larson v.
Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 318, 97 P. 483 (1908) ; Marsden v. Panshall, 1 Vern. 407,
23 Eng. Rep. 548 (Ch. 1686).
11 211 S.C. 516, 46 S.E.2d 147 (1948).
12 New York and Utah have joined the states with specific statutes allowing
for the discovery of chattels since the rendering of the decisions cited in footnote 10.
13 71 N.H. 332, 51 A. 1075 (1902).
14 14 Cal. App. 414, 112 P. 564 (1910).
15 Upton Bradeen & James Ltd. v. Plastic Ind. (Alberta) Ltd., (1957-58) 23
West. Weekly R. 343, [1958] D.L.R. 2d 336 (1957). This case was an action by plain-
tiff for the purchase price of certain plastic products and a counterclaim by defendant
for damages resulting from the delivery of defective goods. Defendant claimed that a
polyethylene screw, which was part of the product received by it, was defective causing
unsatisfactory operation of the product. Plaintiff sought discovery and the right to in-
spect and saw the screw in half for purposes of showing that it was not defective, but
[Vol. 25
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and chemical analysis.16 This court goes one step further and requires
the production of a chattel for disassembly in spite of the fact that there-
after re-assembly might be impossible.
The result reached in this case is desirable and the court should be
commended. However, the reasoning of the court is questionable. The
court holds that the statute17 authorizes this type of discovery and that
the court had inherent power to order it. The latter basis for the holding
is sound and clearly suppored by the weight of authority from other juris-
dictions.' 8 On the other hand, the first basis relied upon by the court
seems questionable. 19 Revised Code section 2317.48 clearly states that
the discovery sought is to be procured through the use of interrogatories.
This indicates that the discovery of chattels is not contemplated by the
statute. In the two prior Ohio cases previously referred to20 which
ordered the production of chattels, the courts cited the statute, but did
not explain how the statute authorized such production. Consequently,
those cases offer very little support to the court's statutory interpretation
in the instant case. In fact, Driver v. Woolworth 2 1 relied upon by the
court in support of the proposition that the statute authorizes the dis-
covery of chattels, may not have been based on that proposition at all. In
that case the defendant filed interrogatories with his answer in accordance
with the statute. One of the interrogatories asked for the chemical
analysis of the mascara involved in the action and it was only after the
plaintiff refused to answer the interrogatory that the court ordered a
production of the mascara for chemical analysis. Thus it seems that the
order for production in that case may have been used by the court only
to enforce its legitimate pre-trial procedures.
The court in the instant case cites two Massachusetts cases 22 as
authority for the proposition that a statute authorizing an action for dis-
covery, as Ohio's does, is applicable to chattels as well as to documents
and facts. At the time of these two decisions there existed in Massa-
chusetts several statutes 2 3 similar to Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.48
in that they provided for discovery by way of interrogatories. But in
was of good quality and material. In spite of the fact that rule 518 of the court per-
mitted discovery and inspection of chattels and permitted experiments to be made on
them, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to saw the screw in half on the grounds
that discovery of personal property or inspection thereof cannot be granted where
such an order would involve the partial or total destruction of the property or any
mutilation or division thereof.
16 Driver v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 59 Ohio App. 299, 16 N.E.2d 548 (1938);
Lawson v. Hudepohl Brewing Co., 46 Ohio Op. 15, 101 N.E.2d 254 (1951).
'7 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.48 (Page 1953), note 2 supra.
Is See Annot., 13 A.L.R2d 657.
19 Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.48 (Page 1953), note 2 supra.
20 Supra note 16.
21 Ibid.
22 Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Bresnahan, 332 Mass. 629, 79 N.E.2d 195 (1948);
MacPherson v. Boston Edison Co., 336 Mass. 94, 142 N.E2d 758 (1957).
23 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, §§ 12-13; ch. 231, § 61.
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both cases the decision was based upon a declaration of inherent power
in the court to order the production of chattels for discovery purposes.
The court in those cases cited the statutes and stated that they did not
impair the inherent power of the courts to order production of chattels,
but the decisions were not based upon the statutes.
The refusal of the Ohio Supreme Court to certify 24 in the instant
case may be interpreted as an approval of the result reached by the lower
court. It is to be hoped that if that court were confronted with a similar
problem, it would come to the same result that the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals did in this case, basing its decision upon the inherent
power of the courts. However, should the court follow the attitude previ-
ously taken by it toward discovery procedure, an opposite result to that
reached in the instant case would seem to be dictated. This attitude is
best exemplified in Ex parte Schoepf 2 5 and Chapman v. Lee.2 6 In these
two cases and most others the court has decided, it has refused to apply
liberal discovery procedures and has seemed set on maintenance of a
strict adversary system.
24 Motion to certify the record overruled June 19, 1963. Appeal dismissed, 175
Ohio St. 162.
25 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
26 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N.E. 736 (1887).
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